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Abstract
This paper analyses the effect of a bivariate risk on the optimal expenses in health 





−increasing concave order decreases the expenses in health care. 
Increasing risk increases the demand for health care for risk-averse and prudent 
individuals in the multivariate sense. Positive (negative) dependence increases 
(decreases) expenses in health care. Increasing the correlation produces the same 
results. Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of medical treat-
ments amplifies the effect of any change in wealth and health risks. We also present 
some policy implications.
Keywords Dependence · Health uncertainty · Health care · Pair-wise risk aversion · 
Increase in risk · Stochastic dominance
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty affects the demand for health care (see for instance Grossman 1972; 
Cropper 1977; Dardanoni and Wagstaff 1990; Finkelstein et al. 2019; Ahangar et al. 
2018). Three sources of uncertainty are present in the literature: wealth risk (that 
is the potential loss of wealth), health risk (that is the potential reduction in one’s 
health) and the risk of the effectiveness of medical care (that is the potential inef-
fectiveness of medical care). Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) give conditions under 
which uncertainty surrounding health care effectiveness increases medical care. 
These conditions are expressed with partial derivatives and cross derivatives of the 
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bivariate utility function of consumption and health and the cross derivatives play an 
important role (see Eeckhoudt et al. 2007).
Palumbo (1999) shows that uncertain health expenses generate precautionary 
savings. Pang and Warshawsky (2010) demonstrate that uninsured health expenses 
lower non-health consumption at all ages and that the wealth available for consump-
tion after deduction of health expenses becomes more volatile in the presence of 
additional background risk. The uncertainty in health expenses implies precaution-
ary savings and shifts from risky assets to risk-free assets. Edwards (2008) presents 
a theoretical model in which portfolio shares are based on health risk. Edwards 
(2008) shows that health status affects portfolio choice through different chan-
nels. Heaton and Lucas (2000) investigate whether risky human capital affects the 
demand for financial assets. Health status influences the level of risk aversion which 
in turn affects the portfolio allocation.
Rosen and Wu (2004) show that poor health increases the proportion of financial 
wealth held in safe assets and decreases the proportion held in other asset catego-
ries. Fan and Zhao (2009) show that adverse health shocks motivate a safer portfolio 
choice. That is, health shocks shift investment from risky assets towards less risky 
assets. Meer et al. (2003) analyse the impact of wealth on health status and show 
that wealth-health connection is not driven by short run changes in wealth. How-
ever, changes in wealth have a strong correlation with changes in health. All the 
papers highlight the relationship between health status and portfolio selection gener-
ally with empirical studies. By considering saving decisions and health investment, 
Denuit et al. (2009) show that the optimal decision variable decreases as the pair of 
risks increases, according to bivariate increasing concave dominance rules. To the 
best of our knowledge, these papers lack important features because they have exam-
ined only the action of health risk on wealth risk but not the way wealth risk acts on 
health risk.
In our approach, wealth risk can play the role of a background risk. Furthermore 
we analyse the effect of the two risks taking together on the demand for health care. 
According to the literature (Keenan et  al. 2008; Gollier and Pratt 1996; Kimball 
1993; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1987, among others), when facing background risks, 
the decision-makers should bear less endogenous risk. In our framework, the deci-
sion-makers should increase their demand for health care. We put emphasis on the 
simultaneous effects wealth and health risks have on the demand for health care. We 
investigate the effect of wealth risk on the willingness to bear health risk.
Our objective is fourfold. Firstly, we aim to analyse the effect of risky wealth on 
the optimal health care investment with a risky health status. This will shed some 
the light on the interaction between health investment and wealth situation (riskless 
or risky). Secondly, we aim to analyse the effect of an increase in both wealth and 
health risk on the demand for health care. Thirdly, we study the effect of the depend-
ence on the health care demand between the two sources of risk. Fourth, we analyse 
how the effect of uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of medical treatments 
affects medical care expenses.
The paper is organised as follows. Section  2 presents the general model. In 
Sect. 3 we analyse how an increase in the pair of risks, according to the bivariate 
increasing concave dominance, affects health care investment. Section 4 presents 
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the modification of the health care demand due to the introduction of a second 
source of risk when facing one source of risk. Section  5 analyses the effect of 
an increase in one source of risk on the demand for health care. The next section 
deals with the dependence between the two sources of risks. In Sect. 7 we analyse 
the demand for medical care is affected by uncertainty surrounding the effective-
ness of medical treatments. We finally end the paper with a conclusion.
2  The General Model
We assume that the decision-maker faces a one-period model such that at time 
zero, he has an exogenous wealth y0 , he knows his current health state h0 and 
chooses the expenses in health care, m
X,H
, to maximise his expected utility given 
by:
We assume that the level of health, taking into account the investment 







≤ 0 and 2
m2
≤ 0 as in Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990), with 
(0, h) = h . For  gives the amount of health produced by medical care and ele-
ments such as nutritional food with input m in state H. X denotes the final risky 
wealth whereas H stands for the future risky health status. This level of health is 
risky because it is affected by changes in the climate, exposure to viruses and so on. 
X can be viewed as a risky portfolio (assets, savings, etc.) or a risky income.




th partial derivative of the bivari-
ate function f .
The utility function is at least such that:
The first-order condition is given by:
The second-order condition is given by:
This condition is fulfilled thanks to our hypothesis.
In what follows, we consider two general cases concerning the health produc-
tion function: an additive form (m,H) = H +(m) like Selden (1993) and a 
(1)u
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u(1,0)(c, h) > 0, u(0,1)(c, h) > 0, u(2,0)(c, h) < 0, u(0,2)(c, h) < 0,
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multiplicative form (m,H) = H(1 + (m)) like Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987). This 
formulation encompasses that of Chang (1996).
3  Changes in Health and Wealth Risks
We now introduce bivariate stochastic dominance and our main results.
3.1  Bivariate Stochastic Dominance
We use the concept of bivariate increasing concave dominance, to analyse how 
health care investment is affected by a change in the pair of risks ( X,H ). We 
note in passing that univariate analysis is a popular paradigm for decision analy-
sis as well as risk analysis. However we utilise bivariate analysis to explicitly 
understand the relationship between random variables.





ing concave functions, denoted by Us1,s2−icv as follows:
Definition 1 u ∈ Us1,s2−icv if and only if







th partial derivative of the bivariate utility 
function u.
We assume that all the partial and the cross derivatives exist up to order s1 and 
s2 for the first and second attributes respectively. The common preferences of all 





































 , then for all functions u in 
Us1,s2−icv
 , we have Eu
(
X1,H1
) ≤ Eu(X2,H2) . In fact (X1,H1) represents an (s1, s2)





We note in passing that alternative decision making and economic models exist 
in addition to stochastic dominance. Consequently, alternative models and deci-
sion making methods may result in alternative conclusions to the ones presented 
in the paper, in particular the behavioural economics models may lead to signifi-
cantly different results. However, stochastic dominance is a frequently employed 
decision making model in economics and with respect to the literature in this area, 
hence we apply this method to our paper. We also note in passing that alterna-
tive risk analysis and management methods exist to those discussed in the paper 
[for instance Markowitz portfolio theory and risk management (see Markowitz 
(1952)]. Whilst we acknowledge their importance to the literature, the focus on 
(−1)k1+k2+1u(k1,k2)(c, h) ≥ 0 ∀k1 = 0,… , s1∀ k2 = 0,… , s2;k1 + k2 ≥ 1
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this paper is on risk analysis and management in the context of a decision-maker 
with facing simultaneous and bivariate risk (namely health and wealth risk).
3.2  The Main Results
We want to point out the effect of the change in the pair of risks (health and wealth 
risks) on the demand for health care. To this end, we compare the optimal decision 








 such that the latter domi-




—increasing concave dominance rule. Let 




 , respectively) the optimal decision when the bivariate 








 respectively]. We give conditions under which 
improving the bivariate risk leads to a decrease of the optimal investment in health 
care. We consider the case of multiplicative health production function and that of 
additive health production function.
3.2.1  The Case of a Multiplicative Health Production Function
Firstly, let us consider the case of multiplicative health production function. The 
health production function takes the following form:
with
We have the following result:





































 expressed at m∗
1
 
is negative. That is:
(2)(m,H) = H + H(m)
(m) ≥ 0,�(m) ≥ 0,��(m) ≤ 0 and (0) = 0
∀c, h − h
u(k1,k2+1)(c, h)
u(k1,k2)(c, h)
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due to the first-order condition concerning m∗
1
 . This condition holds if and only if
or equivalently if and only if:
Remark that
Therefore, the condition to fulfil becomes:
Equivalently:










































⇔ v(c, h) = −hu(0,1)(c, h) ∈ Us1,s2−icv
(−1)k1+k2+1v(k1,k2)(c, h) ≥ 0 ∀c, h, ∀k1 = 0,… , s1, ∀k2 = 0,… , s2; k1 + k2 ≥ 1



































































































≥ 0,∀k1 = 0,… , s1,



























∀k1 = 0,… , s1, ∀k2 = 0,… , s2; k1 + k2 ≥ 1
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The condition involves the generalised coefficients of relative risk aversion in 
health defined as follows:
Also the condition states that this generalised coefficient must be greater than a 
benchmark value given by k2.





 , whereas the coefficient of relative risk aversion of order k2 corre-




 where v is the univariate utility function of health. In fact, 
RRk1,k2 (c, h) corresponds to the coefficient of relative risk aversion of order k2 of the 
utility function u(k1,0) of order k2 , with respect to the second attribute. Risk aversion 
of order two corresponds to usual risk aversion (introduced by Pratt 1964), risk aver-
sion of order three corresponds to prudence (introduced by Kimball 1990), risk 
aversion of order four corresponds to temperance (introduced by Kimball 1993), risk 
aversion of order five corresponds to edginess (introduced by Lajeri-Chaherli 2004) 
and so forth.
Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) show that the respective benchmark values of relative risk 





is k2 . This last result is due to Wang and Li (2010).
Therefore, the condition stands that for all values of k2 up to s2 the coefficients 
of relative risk aversion of u(k1,0) , with respect to the second attribute (the one con-
cerned by the decision variable) at any order up to s2 , are less than their respective 
order.
The use of the multiplicative health production function implies that the condi-
tions in Theorem 1 are expressed in terms of relative risk aversion of higher order 
(relative risk aversion, relative prudence, relative temperance…). For example, if we 




(c, h) ≥ 1∀c, h ∶ Relative risk aversion of u(0,0) = u with respect 
to health greater than one.−hu
(1,2)
u(1,1)
(c, h) ≥ 1∀c, h : Relative risk aversion of u(1,0) with 
respect to health greater than one.u(1,1)(c, h) ≤ 0∀c, h : Pair-wise risk aversion (mul-
tivariate risk aversion) and the utility function is increasing with the two attributes.
The condition u(1,1)(c, h) = 
2u
ch
≤ 0 corresponds to multivariate risk aversion 
introduced by Richard (1975), and named pair-wise risk aversion by Scarsini (1985), 
as follows:
Definition 2 An individual is said to behave in a multivariate risk averse manner if 

































with c1 ≤ c2 and h1 ≤ h2.
In the expected utility framework, this definition is equivalent to:
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That is, the utility function is sub-modular or 2-antitone. According to Richard 
(1975), “The decision-maker prefers getting some of the ‘best’ and some of the 
‘worst’ to taking a chance on all [of] the ‘best’ or all [of] the ‘worst’”. Or equiva-
lently, the decision-maker prefers having low wealth with good health or high wealth 
with poor health instead of having high wealth with good health or low wealth with 
poor health. u(1,1) ≤ 0 means that the marginal utility of wealth decreases with health 
status and vice versa.
3.2.2  The Case of Additive Health Production Function
Second, let us consider the case of additive production function. The health produc-
tion function takes the following form:
with at least
Recall that the functional form chosen by Denuit, Eeckhoudt and Menegatti (2009) 
was the following:
The decision maker chooses the amount m invested in health care to maximise his 
expected utility:
The first-order condition is given by:
The second-order condition is satisfied. Thus, the optimum is an interior optimum.
The following result which concerns the additive production function generalises 
the result from Denuit et al. (2009):
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(3)(m,H) = H +(m),
(m) ≥ 0,�(m) ≥ 0,��(m) ≤ 0 and (0) = 0.
(m,H) = H + m.
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or equivalently if and only if:
The condition is fulfilled when u ∈ Us1,s2+1−icv . □
For example, if we consider the particular case with s1 = 1 and s2 = 1 , the 
conditions to be fulfilled in order to see a decrease in the demand for health care 
after an increase in the pair of risks according to the (1, 1)− increasing concave 
order are the following:
u(0,2) ≤ 0 : Risk aversion with respect to health;
u(1,1) ≤ 0 : Pair-wise risk aversion;
u(1,2) ≥ 0 : Cross-prudence with respect to health;
and the utility function increases with the two attributes as usual.
The condition u(1,2) ≥ 0 corresponds to cross-prudence introduced by Eeck-
houdt et al. (2007) as follows:
Definition 3 Cross-prudence with respect to the second attribute of 






c2 + Ẽ2, h2
)]
 over the 50–50 lottery 
[(







c1 ≤ c2, h2, and Ẽ2 such that E(Ẽ2) = 0.
Jokung (2011) related cross-prudence to risk apportionment of order (1,2). 
Risk apportionment means that the individual prefers to disaggregate risks 
across the different states of nature. In addition, it is supposed that the individ-
ual prefers to get some of the ‘good’ and some of the ‘bad’, rather than taking a 
chance on all of the ‘good’ and all of the ‘bad’ (pair-wise risk aversion).
4  On One Risk to Two Risks
We start with the situation without uncertainty and we tackle two cases: first the 
decision-maker faces a health risk and we introduce a wealth risk; second, the 
decision-maker deals with a wealth risk and we add a health risk. We want to 









⇔ v(c, h) = −u(0,1)(c, h) ∈ Us1,s2−icv
(−1)k1+k2+1v(k1,k2)(c, h) ≥ 0 ∀c, h, ∀k1 = 0,… , s1,∀k2 = 0,… , s2; k1 + k2 ≥ 1
⇔(−1)k1+(k2+1)+1u(k1,k2+1)(c, h) ≥ 0 ∀c, h, ∀k1 = 0,… , s1,∀k2 = 0,… , s2; k1 + k2 ≥ 1








 denote the decisions with the riskless wealth, 
with the riskless health and with both riskless wealth and riskless health, 
respectively.
4.1  Health Risk
In the initial situation, without any risk, the decision-maker maximises his utility 
and he determines the optimal expenses in medical care without uncertainty. First, 
we introduce the health risk (we replace the mean of the random health status by the 
random health status itself), the decision-maker chooses the expenses in health care 
when facing (E(X),H) and the optimal expenses in health care are m∗
E(X),H
 . The con-
vexity of the marginal utility with respect to health is sufficient to guarantee an 
increase in the demand for health care. We are in presence of a precautionary behav-
iour. The decision-maker increases the amount invested in health care in order to 
take into account the introduction of the uncertainty. This result is analogous to that 
of Palumbo (1999) concerning precautionary savings. The convexity of the marginal 




 when u(0,3) ≥ 0 




≥ 2 (relative prudence greater than two) with a multiplicative health produc-
tion function.




 , obtained when facing (X,H) . Intu-
itively, this particular increase in wealth risk (for example changing a safe portfolio 
for a risky one) will have an equivalent effect as an increase in income uncertainty. 
In the univariate framework, as shown by Kimball and Weil (2009) decreasing abso-
lute risk aversion is sufficient to ensure a prudent behaviour, and consequently an 
increase in the demand for health care. We generalise this result.














(c, h) ≥ 1; − hu(1,2)
u(1,1)
(c, h) ≥ 1; − hu(2,2)
u(2,1)






Proof The first-order condition expressed at m = m∗
E(X),E(H)
 is non-negative if and 
only if:
This is true if hu(0,1) is a convex function of health. That is,
Thus the result follows.
−u(1,0)
(
y0 − m, h0
)
+ �(m)EHu(0,1)(E(X),H + (m)H) ≥ 0
⇔EHu(0,1)(E(X),H + (m)H) ≥ E(H)u(0,1)(E(X),E(H) + (m)E(H)) .
2u(0,2)(c, h) + hu(0,3)(c, h) ≥ 0.
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Concerning the second part of the proposition, remark that (X,H)≼2,1
−icv
(E(X),H) 
and apply Theorem 1. □




 imply that the coefficients of rel-
ative risk aversion of u(0,0), u(1,0) and u(2,0) to be greater than one but also the utility 
function to exhibit risk aversion (u(0,2) ≤ 0 and u(2,0) ≤ 0) , pair-wise risk aversion 
( u(1,1) ≤ 0) , cross-prudence ( u(1,2) ≥ 0 and u(2,1) ≥ 0) , temperance ( u(2,2) ≤ 0).
Proposition 1 bis Assume the health production function is additive.












Proof The first-order condition with the health risk expressed at m = m∗
E(X),E(H)
 is 
non-negative if and only if:
This is true if u(0,1) is convex with respect to health. That is u(0,3) ≥ 0. For the 
second part of the proposition, remark that (X,H)≼,12
−icv
(X,E(H)) and apply Theo-
rem 2. □
The details concerning the conditions to be fulfilled in order to ensure that 
the introduction of the wealth risk in presence of the health risk will increase the 
demand for medical care are:
– Increase in both attributes;
– Concavity of the utility function with respect to both attributes;
– Pair-wise risk aversion;
– Cross-prudence with respect to both arguments;
– Temperance.
The concept of temperance was introduced by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) as follows:
Definition 4 Temperance is equivalent to the preference for the 50–50 lottery 
[(




c, h + Ẽ2
)]
 over the 50–50 lottery 
[(




 ∀c , h , and 
Ẽ1, Ẽ2 two independent zero-mean random variables.
Temperance corresponds to bivariate risk apportionment of order (2,2). That is, a 
type of preference for disaggregation of the addition of two independent zero-mean 
random variables in each attribute of the utility function.
−u(1,0)
(
y0 − m, h0
)
+�(m)Eu(0,1)(E(X),H +(m)) ≥ 0
⇔Eu(0,1)(E(X),H +(m)) ≥ u(0,1)(E(X),E(H) +(m))
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4.2  Wealth Risk
In this section we analyse the effect of the introduction of wealth risk on the 
demand for health care. We tackle this analysis sequentially, first dealing with the 
case where there is no uncertainty about health and introduction wealth risk. We 
then move on to the case where there is uncertainty about health, before introduc-
ing wealth risk. In the first case, where there is no uncertainty and we introduce 
wealth risk, the decision-maker chooses the expenses in health care to maximise 
expected utility when facing (X,E(H)) . The optimal expenses in health care are 
m∗
X,E(H)
 . These optimal expenses are greater than those without wealth risk if the 
marginal utility related to health is convex with respect to wealth in case of addi-
tive production function. This is precautionary due to saving motives (see Kim-
ball 1990; Drèze and Modigliani 1972; Sandmo 1970; Leland 1968) via the 
demand for health.




 . The decision-maker faces a wealth 
risk and we introduce a health risk. Therefore, the demand for health care must 
take into account the increase in global uncertainty. Our intuition is to see an 
increase in the demand for health care. We have the following results:
Proposition 2 Assume the production function is multiplicative.











(c, h) ≥ 1; − hu(1,2)
u(1,1)
(c, h) ≥ 1; − hu(0,3)
u(0,2)
(c, h) ≥ 2; − hu(1,3)
u(1,2)
(c, h) ≥ 2 ∀c, h, then
Proof The first-order condition expressed at m = m∗
E(X),E(H)
 is non-negative if and 
only if:
This is true if u(0,1) is convex with respect to wealth. That is, u(1,2) ≥ 0.
Remark that (X,H)≼1,2
−icv
(X,E(H)) and apply Theorem 1. □




 are the coefficients of relative risk 
aversion of u(0,0) and u(1,0) with respect to health to be greater than one and the 
coefficients of relative prudence of u(0,0) and u(1,0) to be greater than two.
Proposition 2 bis Assume the health production function is additive.























(m)E(H)Eu(0,1)(X,E(H) + (m)E(H)) ≥ 0
⇔Eu(0,1)(X,E(H) + (m)E(H)) ≥ Eu(0,1)(E(X),E(H) + (m)E(H)) .
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Proof The first-order condition expressed at m = m∗
E(X),E(H)
 is non-negative if and 
only if:
This is true if u(0,1) is convex with respect to wealth. That is, u(2,1) ≥ 0.
Concerning the second part of the proposition, remark that (X,H)≼1,2
−icv
(X,E(H)) 
and apply Theorem 2. □
The first part of Proposition 2 bis corresponds to the bivariate version of the pre-
cautionary expenses in medical care due to a prudent decision-maker. The introduc-
tion of a second source of risk induces an increase in the demand for health care. 
There is an extra positive demand for health care due to income risk in the first 
case and due to health risk in the second case. There is a form of hedge-health care 
investment, where the decision-maker uses the health care investment to prevent 
the increase in global risk, following the introduction of the second source of risk 
(wealth risk or health risk). With an additive health production function, the effect 
of the introduction of wealth risk in the absence of health risk will be of larger mag-
nitude for those individuals who are cross-prudent with respect to wealth.
5  Increasing Health or Wealth Risks
In this section, we increase one of the two risks with respect to the univariate sto-
chastic dominance rule.
5.1  Stochastic Dominance
In the univariate framework, consider two random variables Z and T  with respective 
cumulative distribution functions F and G with bounded supports contained within 
the interval [a, b] . Let
Definition 5 The distribution F , or equivalently the random variable Z, dominates 
the distribution G, or equivalently the random variable T , in the sense of the Nth
-order stochastic dominance if and only if:
And Fn(b) ≤ Gn(b), ∀n = 1,… ,N − 1.
−u(1,0)
(
y0 − m, h0
)
+�(m)Eu(0,1)(X,E(H) +(m)) ≥ 0
⇔Eu(0,1)(X,E(H) +(m)) ≥ u(0,1)(E(X),E(H) +(m))
F
1









Gn−1(z)dz, ∀n ≥ 2.
FN(x) ≤ GN(x), ∀x ∈ [a, b],
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We write G ≼N F to denote that F dominates G with respect to the Nth− order 
stochastic dominance.
N = 1 , N = 2 and N = 3 correspond to the first-order stochastic dominance 
(FSD), second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) and third-order stochastic domi-
nance (TSD).
5.2  Increasing Health Risk
We tackle two cases, first the health risk is the unique risk ( H2) faced by the deci-
sion-maker. The decision-maker determines the optimal amount, m∗
E(X),H2
, to max-
imise his expected utility before the increase in the health risk. After this increase, 
he or she determines the optimal amount, m∗
E(X),H1
, to maximise his or her expected 
utility where H2 dominates H1 according to the sth2 −order stochastic dominance.





 . We have the following result establishing condi-
tions on the utility function such that a deterioration of the health risk according 
to the stochastic dominance leads to an increase in the demand for health care. 
The first part of the proposition corresponds to the case of one source of risk 
whereas the second part deals with two sources of risk.
Proposition 3 Assume the health production function is multiplicative.











2. If ∀c, h,− h u(0,k2+1)(c,h)
u
(0,k2)(c,h)
≥ k2, ∀k2 = 1,… , s2 and − h u(1,k2+1)(c,h)
u
(1,k2)(c,h)






Proof H1≼s2H2 implies that (E(X),H1)≼0,s2(E(X),H2) and applying Theorem 1 gives 
the result of part 1. Notice that H1≼s2H2 implies (X,H1)≼1,s2 (X,H2) and applying 
Theorem 1 gives the result of the second part. □
In considering a change in the health risk with only one source of risk, from 
H2 to H1 it is a pure increase in endogenous risk. Recall that the presence of the 
health risk generates a precautionary behaviour, increasing health risk will rein-
force this behaviour. Thus, the decision-maker has incentives to increase the 
demand for health care. If we consider the case of two sources of risks, the deci-
sion-maker faces a background risk and this background risk increases the will-
ingness to bear health risk. So, if in this case, we increase the endogenous risk, 
the decision-maker will intuitively react by increasing the demand for health care. 
We recover the same result when the production function is additive.
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Proposition 3 bis Assume the health production function is additive.










Proof The proof is the same as that of Proposition 3 except that we use Theorem 2 
instead of Theorem 1. □
The two propositions generalise the results of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) 
concerning the effects of the changes in income and interest risks on the demand for 
savings. In our model, the demand for health care acts like the demand for savings in 
their approach.
From a policy perspective, this proposition suggests that policy measures which 
increase the uncertainty surrounding the average health status will tend to result in 
an increase in the demand for health care. This result generalises that of Dardanoni 
and Wagstaff (1987).
5.3  Increasing Wealth Risk
First, the decision-maker faces only wealth risk and determines the optimal amount, 
m∗
X2,E(H)
 to maximise his expected utility before the increase in the wealth risk. After 
the increase in wealth risk, he or she determines the optimal amount, m∗
X1,E(H)
 to 
maximise his or her expected utility, where X2 dominates X1 according to the s1th− 
order stochastic dominance. Second, the decision-maker faces health and wealth 




 . The first part of the next 
proposition corresponds to the case of one source of risk, whereas the second part 
deals with two sources of risk.
Proposition 4 Assume the health production function is multiplicative.




































Proof X1≼s1X2 implies that (X1,E(H))≼s1,0(X2,E(H)) and applying Theorem 1 gives 
the result of part 1. Notice that X1≼s1X2 implies (X1,H)≼s1,1(X2,H) and applying 
Theorem 1 gives the result of the second part. □
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In the first part of the proposition, wealth risk changes from X2 to X1 . That is a 
pure increase in background risk (exogenous risk). Therefore, this increase in back-
ground risk gives the decision-maker incentives to increase the demand for health 
care in order to hedge the exogenous risk. The conditions, in the second part of the 
proposition, involve the relative risk aversion being greater than one and the relative 
prudence being greater than two.
We have the following result when the health production function is additive.
Proposition 4 bis Assume the health production function is additive.












The proof is the same as that of Proposition 4 except that we use Theorem  2 
instead of Theorem 1. □
For example, assume that the wealth risk increases according to the second order 
stochastic dominance. When facing only the wealth risk (the health status is risk-
less), the decision-maker increases the demand for health care if the bivariate utility 
function exhibits pair-wise risk aversion, risk aversion with respect to wealth and 
cross-prudence with respect to wealth. If the health status is risky, the conditions 
to be fulfilled in order to see an increase in the demand for health care after a sec-
ond degree deterioration of the wealth risk are risk-aversion with respect to the two 
attributes of the utility function, pair-wise risk aversion, cross-prudence with respect 
to wealth and health and temperance.
In periods of crisis, namely after an increase in wealth risk, the individuals will 
react by increasing their demand for health care. Health care plays a hedging role 
against the deterioration of wealth risk.
6  The Case of Dependent Health and Wealth Risks
So far we have studied the effect of the change in the bivariate risk in the deci-
sion process. Now, we want to know whether the dependence of the exogenous risk 
(wealth risk) and the endogenous risk (health risk) affects the decision process. To 
do so, we consider the case of Bernoulli-distributed variables and the concept of 
quadrant dependence.
6.1  Bernoulli‑Distributed Variables: Correlation
Assume that X and H take two values x1 and x2 for X with x1 ≤ x2 and h1 and h2 for 
H with h1 ≤ h2 . x1 represents low wealth whereas x2 corresponds to high wealth. h1 
corresponds to poor health status whereas h2 represents good health status. The joint 
distribution of (X,H) is given by:
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= 1 − p.









= 1 − q.
There are three cases depending on the value of the dependence parameter :
𝜌 > 1 : X and H are positively correlated;
 = 1 : X and H are independent;
𝜌 < 1 : X and H are negatively correlated.
Let m∗
⊥
 and m∗ be the optimal decisions in the case of independence and 
dependence, respectively. Intuition suggests that a positive correlation will induce 
an increase in the demand for health care because with positive correlation poor 
health status is likely to be accompanied by low wealth. Therefore, that gives 
the decision-maker incentives to hedge against this bad situation (low health and 
poor health) by increasing the demand for health care. The negative correlation 
will have the opposite effect and will give incentives to reduce the demand for 
health care because poor health is likely to be accompanied by high wealth. The 
exogenous risk acts like a hedge-wealth. We have the following propositions:
Proposition 5 Assume the health production function is multiplicative. If 
u ∈ U1,1−icv with −h
u(1,2)(c,h)
u(1,1)(c,h)
≥ 1,∀c, h , then
 I. If X and H are positively correlated, then m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
.
 II. If X and H are negatively correlated, then m∗ ≤ m∗
⊥
.









X = x1,H = h2
)
= p(1 − q),
P
(
X = x2,H = h1
)
= q(1 − p),
P
(
X = x2,H = h2
)
= 1 − p − q + pq.
− u(1,0)
(





x1, h1 + (m)h1
)
+ p(1 − q)h2u
(0,1)
(
x1, h2 + (m)h2
)
+ q(1 − p)h1u
(0,1)
(
x2, h1 + (m)h1
)
+ (1 − p − q + pq)h2u
(0,1)
(
x2, h2 + (m)h2
)
= 0.




The first-order condition expressed at m = m∗
⊥
 is non-negative if and only if 
( − 1) ∗ is non-negative. That is, −hu(0,1)(x, h) exhibits pair-wise risk aversion:




≥ 1 , ∀x, h.
The first-order condition can be rewritten as follows:
Assume that X and H are positively correlated ( 𝜌 > 1) . Then, m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
 if the first-
order condition expressed with m∗
⊥
 is non-positive:
Thus the result follows. The positive correlation increases the value of the decision 
variable. For the case of negative correlation, the proof is the same. □
The conditions in Proposition 3 are pair-wise risk-aversion coupled with rela-
tive risk aversion with respect to health greater than one.
− u(1,0)
(






+ ( − 1)pqh1u
(0,1)
(

























x1, h1 + (m)h1
)
+ p(1 − q)h2u
(1,0)
(
x1, h2 + (m)h2
)
+ (1 − p)qh1u
(1,0)
(
x2, h1 + (m)h1
)
+ (1 − p)(1 − q)h2u
(1,0)
(





(x1, h1 + (m)h1) + h2u
(0,1)
(x2, h2 + (m)h2) − h2u
(0,1)





−u(0,1)(x, h) − hu(0,2)(x, h)
]
x
≤ 0⇔−u(1,1)(x, h) − hu(1,2)(x, h) ≤ 0.
−u(1,0)
(






+ ( − 1)pq ∗= 0.
−u(1,0)
(






+ ( − 1)pq ∗≥ 0.
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Proposition 5 bis: Assume the health production function is additive. If u ∈ U1,1−icv 
with u(1,2) ≥ 0, then
 i. If X and H are positively correlated, then m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
.
 ii. If X and H are negatively correlated, then m∗ ≤ m∗
⊥
.
Proof The first-order condition is given by:
Equivalently:
where
Let  = u(0,1)(x1, h1) + u(0,1)(x2, h2) − u(0,1)(x1, h2) − u(0,1)(x2, h1),
 is non-negative (respectively non-positive) if and only if u(0,1) is super-modular 
(respectively sub-modular). That is, u(1,2) ≥ 0.
The first-order condition can be rewritten as follows:
Assume that X and H are positively correlated ( 𝜌 > 1) . Then, m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
 if the first-














































































+ ( − 1)pq = 0
−u(1,0)
(






+ ( − 1)pq ≥ 0
⇔ ( − 1)pq ≥ 0
⇔ ≥ 0.
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Thus the result follows. The positive correlation increases the value of the decision 
variable. In case of negative correlation, the proof is the same. □
In the case of additive health production function, the partial derivatives alter-
nate in sign. The conditions are pair-wise risk aversion and cross-prudence with 
respect to health.
Conditions in Proposition 5 mean that the utility function belongs to U1,1−icv 
(the utility function exhibits pair-wise risk aversion) and the coefficient of rela-
tive risk aversion of u(1,0) is greater than one. The last condition implies u(1,2) ≥ 0, 
meaning that the utility function exhibits cross-prudence with respect to health. 
Therefore, conditions in Proposition 5 are more stringent than those in Proposi-
tion 5 bis.
6.2  Increasing the Correlation
Epstein and Tanny (1980) show that an increase in the dependence on parameter 
 is disliked by any bivariate risk-averse decision-maker ( u(1,1) ≤ 0, ) . That is,













 denote the respective demand for health care.
Intuitively, the more health risk and the wealth risk are correlated, the larger 
the demand for health care. This is true for pair-wise risk-averse decision-makers 
because they dislike an increase in the correlation (see Epstein and Tanny 1980). 
We have the following result:
Proposition 6 Assume the health production function is multiplicative. If 
u ∈ U1,1−icv with−h
u(0,2)(c,h)
u(0,1)(c,h)
≥ 1; − hu(1,2)(c,h)
u(1,1)(c,h)
≥ 1,∀c, h, then 1 ≥ 2 ⇒m∗1 ≥ m∗2.
Proof 𝜌1 ≥ 𝜌2 ⇒ (X1,H1)≼1,1−icv(X2,H2).
Thus applying Theorem 1 gives the result. □
Proposition 6 bis Assume the health production function is additive. If u ∈ U1,2−icv
then, 1 ≥ 2 ⇒m∗1 ≥ m∗2.
Proof 
Thus applying Theorem 2 gives the result.
Increasing the dependence increases the optimal value of the amount invested 
in health care when the decision-maker exhibits pair-wise risk aversion. From a 
policy perspective this proposition suggests that policy measures which increase 
(4)𝜌1 ≥ 𝜌2 ⇒ (X1,H1)≼1,1−icv(X2,H2),
𝜌1 ≥ 𝜌2 ⇒ (X1,H1)≼1,1−icv(X2,H2).
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the correlation between health and wealth will tend to result in an increase in the 
demand for health care.
6.3  Quadrant Dependence
Let us deal with a more general concept of dependence, namely that of quadrant 
dependence. We assume that (X,H) is positively (negatively respectively) quadrant 
dependent. Recall the definition of quadrant dependence:
Definition 6 Lehman (1966)
i. (X,H) is said to be positively quadrant dependent if
 ii. (X,H) is said to be negatively quadrant dependent if





– X⊥ and X have the same distribution,
– H⊥ and H have the same distribution and,
– X⊥ and H⊥ are independent.
We want to compare the optimal amount obtained with the dependence between 
the two sources of risks ( m∗) with that obtained in the case of independence ( m∗
⊥
) . 
Denuit et al. (1999a, b) show that:















 be the optimal decision in the case of independence. Intuition suggests 
that positive quadrant dependence will increase the optimal amount invested in 
health care compared to independence, whereas negative quadrant dependence will 
decrease it. We have the following propositions:
Proposition 7 Assume the health production function is multiplicative. If 
u ∈ U1,1−icv with
 i. If (X,H) is positively quadrant dependent, then m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
.
 ii. If (X,H) is negatively quadrant dependent, then m∗ ≤ m∗
⊥
.
P(X > x,H > h) ≥ P(X > x)P(H > h),∀x, h.




≥ 1; − hu(1,2)(c, h)
u(1,1)(c, h)
≥ 1, ∀c, h.
252 O. Jokung, S. Mitra 
1 3
Proof The proof is direct by applying Theorem 1 and the fact that:













Proposition 7 bis Assume the health production function is additive. If u ∈ U1,2−icv
 i. If (X,H) is positively quadrant dependent, then m∗ ≥ m∗
⊥
.
 ii. If (X,H) is negatively quadrant dependent, then m∗ ≤ m∗
⊥
.
Proof The proof is direct by applying Theorem 2 and the fact that:













That is, when the wealth risk and the health risk are dependent via the concept 
of positive quadrant dependence, the decision-maker chooses an optimal value of 
the decision variable higher than what he or she could choose in the event of inde-
pendence. Negative dependence reverses the inequality because poor health is for 
the most part offset by large wealth and low wealth is offset by good health. This is a 
form of homemade diversification.
7  Effectiveness of Medical Treatments
The decision maker sacrifices some consumption in order to improve future health 
status via the health production function. However with uncertainty surrounding the 
effectiveness of future medical care, the final health status taking into account the 
health production function and the uncertainty will be as follows: (m,H)+ ∈ with 
E(∈) = 0 where ∈ determines the efficiency of medical treatment in the future. We 
assume that ∈ and H are independent. Thus, we face a Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
increase in risk. The decision-maker maximises:
Assume that all the risks are independent and define the derived utility function as 
follows:
Therefore, the decision-maker maximises:
(5)u(y0 − m, h0) + Eu(X,(m,H)+ ∈).
V(w, h) = Eu(w, h+ ∈).
u
(





Health Care Investment: The Case of Multiple Sources of Risk 
Let m∗
∈
 , denote the optimal expenses in health care in presence of ∈ . We want to 
point out conditions under which m∗
∈
 is greater than m∗
0
 , the optimal expenses in 
health care without ∈ . We have the following result:
Proposition 8 If u ∈ U1,2−icv, then m∗∈ ≥ m∗.




This result is intuitive because the uncertainty surrounding the efficiency of the 
treatments plays the role of white noise. Therefore, the situation in presence of this 
uncertainty is like the initial one in presence of the health and wealth risks but with 
more global risk. The decision-maker must be risk-averse with respect to health and 
pair-wise risk, while being cross-prudent with respect to health to at least guaran-
tee an increase in the demand for health care, regardless of the form of the health 





sponds to analysing the conditions in which the decision-maker with utility function 
V  will demand more health care than the decision-maker with utility function u in 
presence of wealth and health risks.
8  Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the behaviour of a decision-maker with a multiplicative/
additive health production function with a bivariate utility function facing simulta-
neous health and wealth risk (the bivariate risk). We study the general changes in 




 — increasing concave order and show that 
the optimal value of the amount invested in health care decreases when the utility 




 — increasing concave functions and the coef-




 are less than k1.
In increasing health risk (endogenous risk) or wealth risk (exogenous risk) 
induces an increase in the demand for health care and causes the decision-maker to 
build health capital. We generalise the results concerning the effects of wealth risk 
acting as a background risk on the optimal amount invested in health care. We con-
clude that increasing correlation causes an increase in the optimal investment. Posi-
tive dependence increases the optimal value of the choice variable whereas negative 
dependence decreases it. With uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of future 
medical care, the demand for health care also increases as with the initial case. The 
conditions are more stringent with a multiplicative health production function than 
with additive health production function.
In terms of future work, we would like to investigate extensions to our current 
work. In particular, alternative methods of modelling dependencies between risks 
could be investigated. For instance the application of copulas for modelling depend-
encies between risk factors was considered a favourable method (prior to the Global 
Financial Crisis), its application in health and wealth risk settings may be more 
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viable. We would also like to investigate alternative method of risk management to 
determine the optimal outcomes for decision makers. This is particularly pertinent 
given that risk management is an active area of research where innovations are fre-
quently occurring.
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